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Abstract Emergency situations occur unpredictably and cause individuals and
organizations to shift their focus and attention immediately to deal with the situa-
tion. When disasters become large scale, all the limitations resulting from a lack of
integration and collaboration among all the involved organizations begin to be
exposed and further compound the negative consequences of the event. Often in
large-scale disasters the people who must work together have no history of doing so;
they have not developed a trust or understanding of one another’s abilities, and the
totality of resources they each bring to bear have never before been exercised. As a
result, the challenges for individual or group decision support systems (DSS) in
emergency situations are diverse and immense. In this contribution, we present
recent advances in this area and highlight important challenges that remain.
Keywords Emergency situations  Crisis management  Information systems 
High reliability  Decision support
1 Introduction
Emergency situations, small or large, can enter our daily lives instantly. A morning
routine at home all of a sudden turns into an emergency situation when our 5-year-
old on her way to the school bus trips over a discarded toy, falls and hurts herself. At
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work, the atmosphere in the office turns grim when the news breaks that the
company is not meeting its expected earnings for the second quarter in a row and,
this time, the chief executive officer (CEO) has announced that hundreds of jobs are
on the line. Emergency situations can be man-made, intentional, or accidental.
Especially hard to plan for is the rare and violent twist of nature, such as the
Sumatra–Andaman earthquake of 26 December 2004, with an undersea epicenter
off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, triggering a series of devastating tsunamis
that spread throughout the Indian Ocean, killing approximately 230,000 people.
By definition, emergency situations are situations we are not familiar with––nor
likely to be familiar with––and by their mere happening create acute feelings of
stress, anxiety, and uncertainty. When confronted with emergency situations, one
must not only cope with these feelings, but also make sense of the situation amidst
conflicting or missing information during very intense time periods with very short-
term deadlines. The threat-rigidity hypothesis, first developed by Staw et al. (1981)
and further discussed by Rice (1990), states that individuals undergoing stress,
anxiety, and psychological arousal tend to increase their reliance on internal
hypotheses and focus on dominant cues to emit well-learnt responses. In other
words, the potential decision response to a crisis situation is to go by the book, based
on learned responses. However, if the response situation does not fit the original
training, the resulting decision may be ineffective, and may even make the crisis
situation worse (e. g., the 9/11 emergency operators telling World Trade Center
occupants to stay where they were, unless ordered to evacuate). In order to counter
this bias, crisis response teams must be encouraged and trained to make flexible and
creative decisions. The attitude of those responding to the crisis and the cohesive
nature of the teams involved is critical to the success of the effort (King 2002; Keil
et al. 2002). In an emergency the individuals responding must feel they have all the
relevant observations and information that is available in order to make a decision
that reflects the reality of the given situation. Once they know they have whatever
information they are going to get before the decision has to be made, they can move
to sense-making to extrapolate or infer what they need as a guide to the strategic/
planning decision, which allows them to create a response scenario, which is a series
of integrated actions to be taken. It has also been well-documented in the literature
that the chance of defective group decision making, such as groupthink (Janis 1982),
is higher when the situation is very stressful and the group is very cohesive and
socially isolated. Those involved in the decision are cognitively overloaded and the
group fails to adequately determine its objectives and alternatives, fails to explore
all the options, and also fails to assess the risks associated with the group’s decision
itself. Janis also introduced the concept of hypervigilance, an excessive alertness to
signs of threats. Hypervigilance causes people to make ‘‘ill-considered decisions
that are frequently followed by post-decisional conflict and frustration’’ (Janis
1982). As a result, the challenges for individual or group decision support systems
(DSS) in emergency situations are diverse and immense. In contrast, individuals
performing in emergency command and control roles who may have expertise in the
roles they have undertaken, and who have feelings of trust for others performing
related and supporting roles (such as delivering up-to-date information), are likely
to be able to go into a state of cognitive absorption or flow that captures an
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individual’s subjective enjoyment of the interaction with the technology (Agarwal
and Karahanna 2000), where they cope well with states of information overload
over long periods of time and make good decisions, even with incomplete
information. The knowledge that one is making decisions that involve the saving of
lives appears to be a powerful motivator.
2 A model for emergency management processes
Many events in organizations are emergencies but are sometimes not recognized as
such because they are considered normal problems: developing a new product, loss
of a key employee, loss of a key customer, a possible recall on a product, the
disruption of an outsourced supply chain, etc. Developing a new product is probably
influenced by a belief that, if it is not done now, some competitor will do it and that
will result in the obsolescence of the company’s current product. Because the time
delay in the effort for developing a new product is often much longer than what we
think of as an emergency, we tend not to view many of these occurrences as
emergency processes. This is unfortunate because it means that organizations,
private or public, have many opportunities to exercise emergency processes and
tools as part of their normal processes. One of the reoccurring problems in
emergency preparedness is that tools not used on a regular basis during normal
operations will probably not be used or not be used properly in a real emergency.
The emergency telephone system established for all the power utility command
centers to coordinate actions on preventing a wide-scale power failure was
developed after the first Northeast blackout in the US. It was not used until after the
power grid completely failed and resulted in the second failure almost a decade
later, and then not until 11 h after the start of the failure process. Employees had
forgotten it existed.
Sometimes our view of the emergency management effort is too simplified and
farmed out in separate pieces to too many separate organizations or groups. In
emergency management, the major processes and sub-processes are:
• Preparedness (analysis, planning, and evaluation):
Analysis of the threats
Analysis and evaluation of performance (and errors);
Planning for mitigation;
Planning for detection and intelligence;
Planning for response;
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These segments of the process are cyclic, overlap, require integration,
collaborative participation, involvement of diverse expertise and organizational
units, as well as constant updating. These processes give us a structure for
identifying and categorizing the various information and decision needs DSS must
provide for in emergency situations.
Emergency situations typically evolve during an incubation period in which the
emergency (often unnoticed) builds up to ultimately lead to an acute crisis when the
last defenses fall or when the circumstances are just right. For organizations, it is
therefore crucial to focus on this phase and try to reduce the consequences or
prevent the emergency from developing at all. During the preparedness, mitigation,
and detection phases, it is important to prepare for the eventuality of an emergency
by understanding the vulnerabilities of an organization, analyzing early warning
signals which may point at threats to which the organization may already be or
become exposed, and by taking precautionary measures to mitigate the possible
effects of the threats. Developing emergency plans is one of the key activities in the
preparedness phase. It should be clear that planning is critical and it is something
that must go on all the time, especially since the analysis and evaluation processes
must be a continuous processes in any organization that wants to be able to manage
the unexpected in a reliable and responsive manner. Mitigation goes hand in hand in
with detection, and what we do in mitigation is often influenced by the ability to
detect the event with some window of opportunity prior to the event. The response
phase is a very different phase during which the initial reaction to the emergency is
carried out and the necessary resources are mobilized, requiring an intense effort
from a small or large number of people dealing with numerous simultaneous
emergencies of different scope and urgency. During the recovery phase, the pace of
the action has slowed down from the hectic response phase, and there may be a need
for complex planning support to relocate thousands of homeless families, to decide
on loans for businesses to be rebuilt, or to start with the most urgent repairs of
damaged public infrastructure. However, given a pandemic like the avian flu, the
distinction between response and recovery becomes somewhat meaningless. Clearly
the scale of the disaster can produce considerably complex and difficult situations
for the recovery phases as evidenced by both 9/11 and Katrina.
The remainder of this chapter is structured according to the DSS needs for the
various emergency management processes. In the following section, we introduce
high-reliability organizations, a remarkable type of organization that seems to be
well prepared and thrives well even though it deals with high-hazard or high-risk
situations routinely. Concluding from this strand of research that mindfulness and
resilience are key aspects of emergency preparedness, we discuss information
security threats and indicate how DSS may help organizations to become more
mindful and prepared. In Sect. 4, we focus on DSS for emergency response, and
present a set of generic design premises for these DSS. As a case in point, we discuss
a DSS for nuclear emergency response implemented in a large number of European
countries. In Sect. 5, we focus on the recovery phase, and we highlight the role and
importance of humanitarian information and decision support systems. We describe
the example of Sahana, an open-source DSS developed since the 2004 tsunami
disaster in Sri Lanka. We conclude in Sect. 6 by summarizing our main findings.
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3 DSS for emergency preparedness and mitigation
3.1 Mitigation in high-reliability organizations
Some organizations seem to cope very well with errors (Wolf 2001). Moreover, they
do so over a very long time period. Researchers from the University of California in
Berkeley called this type of organization high-reliability organizations (HROs):
‘‘How often could this organization have failed with dramatic consequences? If the
answer to the question is many thousands of times the organization is highly
reliable’’ (Roberts 1990). Examples of HROs are nuclear power plants, aircraft
carriers, and air-traffic control, all of which are organizations that continuously face
risk because the context in which they operate is high hazard. This is so because of
the nature of their undertaking, the characteristics of their technology, or the fear of
the consequences of an accident for their socio-economic environment. The
signature characteristic of an HRO, however, is not that it is error-free, but that
errors do not disable it (Bigley and Roberts 2001). For this reason, HROs are forced
to examine and learn from even the smallest errors they make.
Processes in HROs are distinctive because they focus on failure rather than success:
inertia as well as change, tactics rather than strategy, the present moment rather than
the future, and resilience as well as anticipation (Roberts 1990; Roberts and Bea 2001).
Effective HROs are known by their capability to contain and recover from the errors
they make and by their capability to have foresight into errors they might make. HROs
avoid accidents because they have a certain state of mindfulness. Mindfulness is
described as the capability for rich awareness of discriminatory detail that facilitates
the discovery and correction of potential accidents (Weick 1987; Weick and Sutcliffe
2001). Mindfulness is less about decision making and more about inquiry and
interpretation grounded in capabilities for action. Weick et al. (1999) mention five
qualities that HROs possess to reach their state of mindfulness, also referred to as high-
reliability theory (HRT) principles (Van Den Eede and Van de Walle 2005), and
shown in Fig. 1. It is sometimes stated in a joking manner that long term survival of
firms is more a function of those firms that make the smallest number of serious errors
and not those that are good at optimization. Some of the recent disasters for companies
in the outsourcing of supply chains may be a new example of this folklore being more
wisdom than it is currently believed. The more efficient the supply chain (thereby
providing no slack resources), the more disaster prone it is (Markillie 2006).
As Fig. 1 indicates, reliability derives from the organization’s capabilities to
discover as well as manage unexpected events. The discovery of unexpected events
requires a mindful anticipation, which is based in part on the organization’s
preoccupation with failure. As an illustrative case of a discipline that is very
concerned with the discovery of unexpected events and the risk of failure, we will
next discuss how information security focuses on mindfulness in the organization.
3.2 Mindfulness and reliability in information security
Information security is a discipline that seeks to promote the proper and robust use
of information in all forms and in all media. The objective of information security is
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to ensure an organization’s continuity and minimize damage by preventing and
minimizing the impact of security incidents (von Solms 1998; Ma and Pearson
2005). According to Parker, information security is the preservation of confiden-
tiality and possession, integrity and validity, and the availability and utility of
information (Parker 1998). While no standard definition of information security
exists, one definition used is as follows: Information security is a set of controls to
minimize business damage by preventing and minimizing the impact of security
incidents. This definition is derived from the definition in the ISO 17799 standard
(ISO 17799 2005) and accepted by many information security experts. The ISO
17799 is defined as a comprehensive set of controls comprising best practices in
information security and its scope is to give recommendations for information
security management for use by those who are responsible for initiating,
implementing, or maintaining security in their organization. The ISO 17799
standard has been adopted for use in many countries around the world including the
UK, Ireland, Germany, The Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, South Africa, and others.
Security baselines have many advantages in the implementation of information
security management in an organization, such as being simple to deploy and using
baseline controls, easy to establish policies, maintain security consistency, etc.
However, such a set of baseline controls addresses the full information systems
environment, from physical security to personnel and network security. As a set of
universal security baselines, one of the limitations is that it cannot take into account
the local technological constraints or be present in a form that suits every potential
user in the organization. There is no guidance on how to choose the applicable
controls from the listed ones that will provide an acceptable level of security for a
specific organization, which can create insecurity when an organization decides to
ignore some controls that would actually have been crucial. Therefore, it is
necessary to develop a comprehensive framework to ensure that the message of
Fig. 1 A mindful infrastructure for high reliability (adapted from Weick et al. 1999)
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commitment to information security is pervasive and implemented in policies,
procedures and everyday behavior (Janczewski and Xinli Shi 2002) or, in other
words, create organizational mindfulness. This framework should include an
effective set of security controls that should be identified, introduced, and
maintained (Barnard and von Solms 2000). Elements of those security controls
are, respectively, a base-lines assessment, risk analysis, policy development,
measuring implementation, and monitoring and reporting action.
One very good reason why emergency management has progressed very rapidly in
the information field is that there is a continuous evolution of the threats and the
technologies of both defense and offense in this area, coupled with the destruction of
national boundaries for the applications that are the subject of the threats (Doughty
2002; Drew 2005; Stoneburner et al. 2001; Suh and Han 2003). Today we have
auditors who specialize in determining just how well prepared a company is to protect
its information systems against all manner of risks. Even individuals face the problem
that their identities can be stolen by experts from another country, who then sell them
to a marketer in yet another country, who then offers them to individuals at a price in
almost any country in the world. In the general area of emergency management,
maybe we need to all learn that it is time to evolve recognized measures of the degree
of emergency preparedness for a total organization rather than just its information
systems (Spillan and Hough 2003; Turoff et al. 2004a, b; Van Den Eede et al. 2006a).
3.3 Decision support systems for information security mindfulness
Group decision support systems (GDSS) have proven to efficiently facilitate
preference and intellective tasks via anonymous exchange of information supported
by electronic brainstorming and to reduce process losses in face-to-face meetings
(Nunamaker et al. 1991), as well as distributed meetings (Hiltz and Turoff 1993;
Hiltz et al. 2005). In a recent field study, a synchronous GDSS was used to
support the exchange of information among senior managers of a large financial
organization during a risk management workshop (Rutkowski et al. 2005;
Rutkowski et al. 2006). This workshop was held to generate and identify an
exhaustive set of risks related to information security. From the large number of
risks generated in this first phase, a smaller number of risks was selected and
assessed in terms of their expected utility (amount of damage), calculated from their
expected impact and probability of occurrence. The most relevant risks were then
discussed in the last phase of the workshop in order to build business preparedness
scenarios to be activated should one of the identified risks actually materialize. The
findings of this study indicated that the use of the GDSS increased the overall level
of mindfulness among the participants on the importance of addressing risks in the
organization. The anonymous input and exchange of information while using the
GDSS encouraged participants to freely express their private opinion about very
sensitive information in the organization. Overall, it was found that the managers
involved in this study obtained a higher feeling of control and appropriation of the
decision taken toward the business continuity scenarios to be built. Similarly, the
fuzzy decision support system FURIA (fuzzy relational incident analysis) allows
individual group members to compare their individual assessment of a decision
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alternative or option (such as an information security risk) to the assessments of the
other group members so that diverging risk assessments or threat remedies can be
identified and discussed (Van de Walle and Rutkowski 2006). At the core of FURIA
is an interactive graphical display visualizing group members’ relative preference
positions, based on mathematical preference and multi-criteria decision support
models (Fodor and Roubens 1994; Van de Walle 2003; Van de Walle et al. 1998).
4 DSS for emergency response
4.1 Design principles for dynamic emergency response systems
Implicit in crises of varying scopes and proportions are communication and
information needs that can be addressed by today’s information and communication
technologies (Bellardo et al. 1984; Fisher 1998; Turoff 2002). What is required is
organizing the premises and concepts that can be mapped into a set of generic design
principles, in turn providing a framework for the sensible development of flexible
and dynamic emergency response information systems. Turoff et al. (2004a, b)
systematically develop a set of general and supporting design principles and
specifications for a dynamic emergency response management information system
(DERMIS) by identifying design premises resulting from the use of the emergency
management information system and reference index (EMISARI), a highly
structured group communication process that followed basic concepts from the
Delphi method (Linstone and Turoff 1975), and design concepts resulting from a
comprehensive literature review. In their paper, Turoff et al. (2004a, b) present a
framework for the system design and development that addresses the communication
and information needs of first responders as well as the decision-making needs of
command and control personnel. The framework also incorporates thinking about the
value of insights and information from communities of geographically dispersed
experts and suggests how that expertise can be brought to bear on crisis decision
making. Historic experience is used to suggest nine design premises, listed in
Table 1. These premises are complemented by a series of five design concepts based
upon the review of pertinent and applicable research. The result is a set of general
design principles and supporting design considerations that are recommended to be
woven into the detailed specifications of a DERMIS. The resulting DERMIS design
model graphically indicates the heuristic taken by this paper and suggests that the
result will be an emergency response system flexible, robust, and dynamic enough to
support the communication and information needs of emergency and crisis personnel
on all levels. In addition it permits the development of dynamic emergency response
information systems with tailored flexibility to support and be integrated across
different sizes and types of organizations (Van Den Eede et al. 2006b).
4.2 Emergency response for industrial disasters: the Chernobyl nuclear disaster
Several large-scale industrial disasters causing considerable loss of human life and
damage to the environment have occurred in the recent past. On 3 December 1984,
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in Bhopal a Union Carbide chemical plant leaked 40 tons of toxic methyl isocyanate
gas, killing at least 15,000 people and injuring about 150,000 more. A lesser known
example but with an even larger impact occurred in Henan Province in China, where
the failing of the Banqiao and Shimantan reservoir dams during typhoon Nina in
1975 killed 26,000 people while another 145,000 died during subsequent epidemics
Table 1 DERMIS design premises (Turoff et al. 2004a, b)
P1 System training and simulation. Turoff et al. argue that finding functions in the emergency response
system that can be used on a daily basis is actually much more effective than isolated training sessions.
Indeed, if the system is used on a day-to-day basis, this will partly eliminate the need for training and
simulation, as those who must operate the system gain extensive experience with the system just by
using it
P2 Information focus. During a crisis, those who are dealing with the emergency risk are flooded with
information. Therefore, the support system should carefully filter information that is directed towards
actors. However, they must still be able to access all (contextual) information related to the crisis as
information elements that are filtered out by the system may still be of vital importance under certain
unpredictable circumstances
P3 Crisis memory. The system must be able to log the chain of events during a crisis, without imposing an
extra workload on those involved in the crisis response. This information can be used to improve the
system for use in future crises, but it can also be used to analyze the crisis itself
P4 Exceptions as norms. Due to the uniqueness of most crises, usually a planned response to the crisis
cannot be followed in detail. Most actions are exceptions to the earlier defined norms. This implies that
the support system must be flexible enough to allow reconfiguring and reallocation of resources during
a crisis response
P5 Scope and nature of crisis. Depending on the scope and nature of the crisis, several response teams
may have to be assembled with members providing the necessary knowledge and experience for the
teams’ tasks. Special care should also be given to the fact that teams may only operate for a limited
amount of time and then transfer their tasks to other teams or actors. The same goes for individual team
members who may, for example, become exhausted after many hours of effort, necessitating passing on
the role to trusted replacements
P6 Role transferability. Individuals should be able to transfer their role to others when they cannot
continue to deal with the emergency. For the support system, this means that clear descriptions of roles
must be present and explicit in the software, as well as a description of the tasks, responsibilities, and
information needs of each role
P7 Information validity and timeliness. As actions undertaken during crises are always based on
incomplete information, it is of paramount importance that the emergency response system makes an
effort to store all the available information in a centralized database which is open equally to all who
are involved in reacting to the situation. Thus, those involved in the crisis response can rely on a broad
base of information, helping them making decisions that are more effective and efficient in handling
the crisis. When they suddenly need unexpected information (something that neither the system nor
others predicted they would need) they need to be able to go after it and determine if it exists or not,
and who can or should be supplying it
P8 Free exchange of information. During crisis response, it is important that a great amount of
information can be exchanged between stakeholders, so that they can delegate authority and conduct
oversight. This, however, induces a risk of information overload, which in turn can be detrimental to
the crisis response effort. The response system should protect participants from information overload
by assuming all the bookkeeping of communications and all the organization that has occurred
P9 Coordination. Due to the unpredictable nature of a crisis, the exact actions and responsibilities of
individuals and teams cannot be pre-determined. Therefore, the system should be able to support the
flow of authority directed towards where the action takes place (usually on a low hierarchical level),
but also the reverse flow of accountability and status information upward and sideways through the
organization
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and famine. In that disaster, about six million buildings collapsed and in total more
than 10 million residents were affected. However, of all industrial disasters in recent
times, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster probably brings to mind the most
apocalyptic visions of worldwide devastation.
The world’s largest nuclear disaster occurred on 26 April 1986, at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in Pripryat, Ukraine in the former Soviet Union. The cause of
the disaster is believed to be a reactor experiment that went wrong, leading to an
explosion of the reactor. As there was no reactor containment building, a radioactive
plume was released into the atmosphere, contaminating large areas in the former
Soviet Union (especially Ukraine, Belarus and Russia), Eastern and Western
Europe, Scandinavia, and as far away as eastern North America, in the days and
weeks following the accident. In the days following the accident, the evidence grew
that a major release of nuclear material had occurred in the Soviet Union, and
measures were taken by governments in the various affected countries to protect
people and food stocks. In the Soviet Union, a huge operation was set up to bring the
accident under control and extinguish the burning reactor, and about 135,000 people
were evacuated from their homes. The number of confirmed deaths as a direct
consequence of the Chernobyl disaster is only 56, most of these being fire and
rescue workers who had worked at the burning power plant site, yet thousands of
premature deaths are predicted in the coming years.
Nuclear power plants have been put forth as examples of what an HRO should be
and yet we still see events like Chernobyl and Three-Mile Island. Some believe the
root cause of Chernobyl was the lack of local authority of the professional operators
of the plant to veto decisions by the higher ups that decided to take the plant
operation outside the limits of the original performance specifications for the
technology. Consider the comparison where a commercial airplane pilot in most
countries has the right to veto the flight of the plane if he or she feels something is
not right with respect to the readiness state of the aircraft. This was the case on 14
August 2006, shortly after the foiled airline terrorism plot in the UK, when British
Airways flight BA179 from Heathrow Airport to New York turned back after an
unattended and ringing cell phone was discovered on board. The pilot went against
the advice of British Airways’ own security team and decided ‘‘to err on the side of
caution’’ (UK Airport News 2006). This example contrasts the lack in the Chernobyl
power plant procedures of any clear process plan for the human roles in the plant
when there is any uncertainty about decisions to be made, the accountability for
those decisions, and the need for oversight. In emergencies with well laid out
preparedness plans there is always the need for a command and control structure
where those role functions have to be very clear to all who are involved.
4.3 RODOS, the real-time online decision support system for nuclear
emergencies
The different and often conflicting responses by the different European countries
following the Chernobyl disaster made it clear that a comprehensive response to
nuclear emergencies was needed in the European Union. Funded by the European
Commission through a number of 3-year research programs (so-called framework
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programs), a consortium of European and formerly Soviet Union based universities
and research institutions worked together to develop a real-time online decision
support system (from which one can form with some creativity the acronym
RODOS) that ‘‘could provide consistent and comprehensive support for off-site
emergency management at local, regional and national levels at all times following
a (nuclear) accident and that would be capable of finding broad application across
Europe unperturbed by national boundaries’’ (Raskob et al. 2005; French et al.
2000; French and Niculae 2005; Ehrhardt and Weiss 2000). The objective was that
RODOS would (Niculae 2005):
• provide a common platform or framework for incorporating the best features of
existing DSS and future developments;
• provide greater transparency in the decision process as one input to improving
public understanding and acceptance of off-site emergency measures;
• facilitate improved communication between countries of monitoring data,
predictions of consequences, etc. in the event of any future accident; and
• promote, through the development and use of the system, a more coherent,
consistent and harmonized response to any future accident that may affect
Europe.
The overall RODOS DSS consists of three distinct subsystems, each containing a
variety of modules:
• Analyzing subsystem (ASY) modules that process incoming data and forecast
the location and quantity of contamination including temporal variation. These
modules contain meteorological, atmospheric dispersion, hydrological disper-
sion, deposition and absorption, health effects, and other models. The ASY
modules predict the evolution of the situation according to the best scientific
understanding of the processes involved.
• Countermeasure subsystem (CSY) modules that suggest possible countermea-
sures, check them for feasibility, and calculate the expected benefit in terms of a
number of criteria.
• Evaluation subsystem (ESY) modules that rank countermeasure strategies
according to their potential benefit and preference judgments provided by the
decision makers.
The interconnection of all program modules, the input, transfer and exchange of data,
the display of the results and its modes of operation (interactive and automatic) are
controlled by the RODOS operating system (OSY), a layer built upon the UNIX
operating system of the host computer. Interaction with users and display of data
takes place via a graphical subsystem (GSY), which includes a purpose-built
geographical information system (RoGIS). This would display demographic,
topographic, economic and agricultural data along with contours of measured or
predicted radiological data. These displays seek to ensure that the output can be used
and understood by a variety of users who may possess qualitatively different skills
and perspectives (Marsden and Hollnagel 1996). In the early phases of an accident,
local decisions are likely to be the responsibility of local plant management.
However, regional emergency planning officers and senior officers in the emergency
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services need to be immediately concerned with oversight, analyzing if there are
sufficient resources to meet the demand, seeking out re-supply when necessary, and
stepping into arrange maintenance and logistic support. In later phases, regional and
national politicians would be involved depending on how serious the accident is.
RODOS is a real-time, online system connected to meteorological and
radiological data networks; thus including several communication modules. Its
database formats are defining the basis for data exchange on a European scale. All
data required by the modules to process information are stored in databases, of
which there are three main categories in RODOS:
• a database storing program data that include input and output data required by or
produced by different modules, intermediate and final results, temporary data,
etc.;
• a real-time database containing information coming from regional or national
radiological and meteorological networks; and
• a geographical database containing geographical and statistical information for
the whole of Europe.
The system is designed to be flexible in order to work equally well under various
circumstances. Therefore, the content of the subsystems and the databases vary
depending on the specific application of the system, i.e., the nature and
characteristics of any potential nuclear accident, different monitoring data, national
regulations, etc. The RODOS models and databases can be customized to different
site and plant characteristics as well as to the geographical, climatic, and
environmental variations across Europe. The current version of the RODOS system
is installed in national emergency centers for use in Germany, Finland, Spain,
Portugal, Austria, The Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Slovenia,
and the Czech Republic. Installation is under consideration in several other
countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Greece, and Switzerland. As a
consequence, RODOS today is the virtually centralized resource for all relevant
information that may be needed in any potential nuclear plant crisis in the European
Union. Clearly, RODOS would be very useful in the event of a terrorist action to
release a radioactive substance through a dirty bomb. However, there is no publicly
stated mission of RODOS to provide this aid to those that would be most concerned
with that type of event. We hope this is not an example of the lack of integration
across governmental organizations responsible for this other problem.
5 DSS for emergency recovery
5.1 Emergency recovery
On 28 August 2005, hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, wreaking havoc in the
states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Many areas of New Orleans were
flooded and winds of more than 100 mph (160 km/h) tore off parts of the roof of the
Superdome stadium where some 9,000 people who were unable or unwilling to
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leave the city were taking refuge. Power lines were cut, trees felled, shops wrecked,
and cars hurled across streets strewn with shattered glass. In the following days, the
scale of the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding
became clearer. About 80% of the low-lying city was under water. Helicopters and
boats were picking up survivors stranded on rooftops across the area––many were to
spend several more days there. On 1 September, with the lack of any local command
and control facility, New Orleans appeared to descend into anarchy, with reports of
looting, shootings, carjacking, and rapes. The local police force, reduced in number
by 30%, was ordered to focus its efforts on tackling lawlessness. Anger mounted
over the delay in getting aid to people in New Orleans and what was seen as an
inadequate response from the federal government. In the following days, the relief
effort was stepped up. Evacuations continued as military convoys arrived with
supplies of food, medicine and water. Finally, on 3 September, more than 10,000
people were removed from New Orleans––the Superdome stadium and the city’s
convention center were cleared. The US appealed for international aid, requesting
blankets, first aid kits, water trucks, and food. One year later, the scale and costs of
the recovery efforts were impressive. FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management
Agency) has paid out more than $13.2 billion under the National Flood Insurance
Policy to policyholders in Louisiana. The US Small Business Administration (SBA)
approved more than 13,000 disaster assistance loans to business owners totaling
$1.3 billion and 78,237 loans to renters and homeowners totaling more than
$5 billion. FEMA issued 1.6 million housing assistance checks totaling more than
$3.6 billion to Louisiana victims, in the form of rental assistance and home repair or
replacement grants (FEMA News release 1603-516 2006).
On the other side of the planet, aid was badly needed for those countries affected
by the 2004 tsunami (mostly Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India) which had
inflicted widespread damage to the infrastructure, leading to a shortage of water and
food. Due to the high population density and the tropical climate of the region,
epidemics were a special concern and bringing in sanitation facilities and fresh
drinking water as soon as possible was an absolute priority. In the days and weeks
following the tsunami, governments all over the world committed to more than
$7 billion in aid for the affected countries, followed by donations from large
companies and many smaller local private initiatives.
No matter how impressive the scope of the final efforts, Katrina demonstrated
what happens when local command and control systems are lost and no realistic and
workable plans exist for integration between the city, state, federal, and private
sector response capabilities. The international response to the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami was nothing less than chaotic in the most crucial first days following the
disaster. When disasters become large in scale all the limitations resulting from a
lack of integration and collaboration among all the involved organizations begin to
expose themselves and further compound the negative consequences of the event.
Often in large-scale disasters the people who must work together have no history of
doing so, they have not developed a trust or understanding of one another’s abilities,
and the totality of resources they each bring to bear were never before exercised.
While a new organization is stumbling around trying to form itself into something
that will work, the disaster does not wait for them.
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5.2 Emergency recovery following major disasters: humanitarian information
systems
In times of major disasters such as hurricane Katrina or the 2004 tsunami, the need
for accurate and timely information is as crucial as is rapid and coherent
coordination among the international humanitarian community (Bui and Sankaran
2001; Currion 2006). Effective humanitarian information systems that provide
timely access to comprehensive, relevant, and reliable information are critical to
humanitarian operations. The faster the humanitarian community is able to collect,
analyze, disseminate and act on key information, the more effective the response
will, the better needs will be met, and the greater the benefit to affected populations.
In 2005 ECHO, the European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian
Aid, announced its decision to approve a total amount of 4 million Euros to support
and enhance humanitarian information systems essential to the coordination of
humanitarian assistance (ECHO 2005). Specifically, it was decided to improve
information management systems and services of the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA was established in 1991
with a specific mandate to work with operational relief agencies to ensure that there
are no gaps in the response and that duplication of effort is avoided. OCHA’s
information management extends from the gathering and collection of information
and data, to its integration, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination via the Internet
and other means.
To respond to information needs, OCHA has developed humanitarian informa-
tion systems which include ReliefWeb, the regional information networks (IRIN),
information management units (IMUs) and humanitarian information centers
(HICs). These services have established solid reputations in the provision of quality
information and are recognized as essential in the coordination of emergency
response among partners in the humanitarian community. Common in the success of
these systems, or information services, is that the information provided is based
upon a solid information exchange network among all partners in the humanitarian
community. ReliefWeb (http://www.reliefweb.int) is the world’s leading online
gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters. Through Re-
liefWeb, OCHA provides practitioners with information on both complex
emergencies and natural disasters worldwide from over 1,000 sources, including
UN, governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the academic commu-
nity, and the media. ReliefWeb consolidates final reports, documents, and reports
from humanitarian partners, providing a global repository one-stop shop for
emergency response information. IRINs gather information from a range of
humanitarian and other sources, providing context and reporting on emergencies
and at-risk countries. IMUs and HICs collect, manage, and disseminate operational
data and information at the field level, providing geographic information products
and a range of operations databases and related content to decision makers in the
field as well as headquarters. Other OCHA humanitarian information systems that
provide complementary information services to meet the full range of information
needs as described above include OCHA Online, the Financial Tracking System
(FTS), and the Global Disaster Alert System (GDAS).
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In the US, the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) was created in 2002 by
Secretary of State Powell as ‘‘a U.S. Government interagency nucleus to identify,
collect, analyze and disseminate unclassified information critical to USG
preparations for and responses to humanitarian emergencies worldwide.’’ In
2004, the task ‘‘to promote best practices for humanitarian information manage-
ment’’ was added to the HIU’s mission statement. The role of the HIU is to
provide critical and reliable information quickly and efficiently to US government
organizations involved in providing humanitarian assistance in response to
disasters and emergencies overseas. The HIU has developed products for the
Secretary of State, the administrator of the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the National Security Council. These products are
almost always created to be unclassified, so that they can be shared easily with
other audiences within the international humanitarian community: the UN, NGOs,
the media, the public, etc. Another role of the HIU is to develop, test, and promote
new technologies for better humanitarian information management. The HIU has
been in the forefront of using and promoting geographic information systems
(GISw) and satellite imagery, both for strategic and operational uses and
applications. In addition, the HIU has tested and promoted the use of personal
digital assistants (PDAs), global positioning systems (GPSs), and digital cameras
on humanitarian field assessments. The HIU has also used collaboration tools and
content management software to improve interagency collaboration and informa-
tion sharing. VISTA is an example of a new web-based visualization tool that not
only provides situational awareness, but facilitates humanitarian situational
analysis as well (King 2006).
5.3 The Sahana open-source humanitarian information and decision support
system
Sahana is a web-based collaboration tool that addresses the common coordination
problems during a disaster from finding missing people, managing aid, managing
volunteers, tracking relocation sites, etc. between government groups, the civil
society (NGOs), and the victims themselves. Sahana is an integrated set of
pluggable, web-based disaster management applications that provide solutions to
large-scale humanitarian problems in the aftermath of a disaster. The main
applications and problems they address are as follows:
• Missing person registry: helping to reduce trauma by effectively finding missing
persons;
• Organization registry: coordinating and balancing the distribution of relief
organizations in the affected areas and connecting relief groups, allowing them
to operate as one;
• Request management system: registering and tracking all incoming requests for
support and relief up to fulfillment and helping donors connect to relief
requirements;
• Camp registry: tracking the location and numbers of victims in the various
camps and temporary shelters set up all around the affected area.
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The development of Sahana, a free and open-source disaster management system
distributed under terms of the GNU lesser general public license, was triggered by
the tsunami disaster in 2004 to help coordinate the relief effort in Sri Lanka (Sahana
Wiki Community 2006). It was initially built by a group of volunteers from the Sri
Lankan information technology (IT) industry and spearheaded by the Lanka
Software Foundation. An implementation of Sahana was authorized and deployed
by CNO (the main government body in Sri Lanka coordinating the relief effort) to
help coordinate all the data being captured. Development of Sahana continues today
to make the system applicable for global use and to be able to handle any large-scale
disaster. Sahana has been deployed successfully in the aftermath of several large
natural disasters, for instance following the large earthquake in Pakistan in 2005,
and the mudslide disaster in the Philippines and the Yogjakarta earthquake, both in
2006. The long term objectives of Sahana are to grow into a complete disaster
management system, including functionality for mitigation, preparation, relief, and
recovery. The current status, ongoing development, and future goals are intensively
discussed in two web-based communities, the Sahana Wiki pages (Sahana Wiki
Community 2006) and the Humanitarian-ICT Yahoo! Group (Humanitarian-ICT
2006).
6 Conclusion
Using standard emergency management terminology, we have in this chapter
categorized DSS for emergency situations according to the different phases of crisis
preparedness, response and recovery. We have presented DSS that have been
developed or implemented in response to some of the worst emergency situations
our society has been confronted with in recent times, such as the Chernobyl, Indian
Ocean tsunami, and hurricane Katrina disasters. Serving as a foundation for this
overview, we started by introducing high-reliability organizations, as these seem to
be dealing remarkably well with emergency situations on a daily basis. In this
conclusion, we stress once again the need for such organizations to support and
sustain efficient emergency response and recovery efforts, and summarize some of
the key aspects of DSS we believe are crucial for high-reliability emergency
management.
6.1 Role multiplicity
In any emergency effort to allocate a particular resource, there are many specific
roles involved and it must be clear to everyone involved who is the person that is
performing a specific role at a specific time. These fundamental role functions are:
• Requesting: individuals who are requesting the resource and are trusted by the
others to know that this request is a valid one.
• Observing or reporting: those trained to be able to make observations about the
situation and report information that will be useful to others in carrying out their
tasks.
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• Allocating: The persons allocating the resource to meet the requests being made
must make judgmental decisions on the priority of each request.
• Local oversight: persons in other areas who know something would interfere
with an allocation must make the others aware of the occurrence of such
interference (mudslides, traffic jams, flooded roads, etc.).
• Maintaining and servicing: making sure that a resource is adequately maintained
and re-supplied with associated items or people.
• Situation analysis and awareness: what is the overall consumption rate of this
resource and what more is occurring in the way of threats that might increase
demand?
• Global re-supply: someone must be seeking other sources for increasing the
availability of the resources.
For any large-scale disaster, at least these seven roles need to be explicitly known to
everyone involved as the response takes place. In cases of explicit toxic and
biological substances an added role function of the expert in the hazard type needs
to be added. Since no one should work 24 h a day, roles have to be backed up but at
any moment there must be a person performing in each of these roles or we can
easily go into situations of overload. The people involved have to be trained in
multiple roles and have to trust one another enough to be willing to hand over their
role to someone else when they are too exhausted to continue. They also need to
know that when they come back to reassume their role that what has occurred and
what they need to know at that moment will be waiting for them as a part of the
system tracking the events associated with each role. Automated systems cannot
work even for local oversight without very extensive sensor networks to input all
possible local conditions while the disaster is in progress.
6.2 Planning and analysis
The planning and analysis functions of emergency preparedness are core to any
overall emergency management operation. They need to directly involve those who
will actually execute the command and control functions as well as some of the on-
site operations. They must focus on the processes and roles involved and should be
tailorable with respect to the definitions of roles and events that are triggered by or
reacted to the various roles. This means any local group should be able to tailor the
content of the operational system they will be using. By assessing the risks and
designing roles and event structures necessary to counter those risks, those who
will use the system should be able to build templates that can be inserted into the
command and control system to guide the actual response process. Since we cannot
take all those who should be involved and afford to make them part of a single
organization dedicated to this purpose of planning and analysis, the challenge is to
turn this function into an HRO-style operation. It must be one we can have
confidence in for large-scale disasters of any type, including those in corporations
as well as those faced by government at all levels. A basic flaw of current
emergence planning and response is the lack of a permanence in a core disaster
response organization that can engage continuously in being an HRO organization,
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develop the plans, recommend the mitigation policies and actions, oversee the
training, be the coordination, command, and control core, and integrate functions
over all the organizations engaged in any large-scale response no matter what the
societal relationships are among the responding parties. Any large-scale emergency
is in effect a situation that demands complete control of the situation by one unified
team for the duration of the situation. That core does not have to be large given
today’s technology and even in 1960s it never exceeded 400 for the federal
government.
Instead of forming committees that meet only once in a while and hand down
finished plans to others who must somehow execute them, we need in the future to
set up virtual organizations (Mowshowich 1997, 2002) of those that would be
involved in the command and control functions as well as the response functions.
They should operate as virtual teams no matter where they are, using the same
command and control system to create templates for roles and events based upon
scenarios of offense threats and defense plans. This system would allow them to act
out roles using the real system and in essence engage in training games that they and
others have designed (Turoff et al. 2006). Over a week one would expect that they
would spend 4–8 h individually, at a time of their choosing, doing this, much as one
might play a multi-player recreational game.
In order to be an HRO, an organization has to exist and operate on a continuous
basis. We cannot have emergency management teams for wide scale disasters that
only exist when the disaster occurs or they will never be able to work as effectively
as an HRO. Since we will always be faced with the limit that physical resources for
most disasters do not come together until the disaster occurs, our only effective
recourse is to set up a continuous ongoing virtual preparedness organization that
uses the same command and control software as its ongoing virtual operational
capability. This would appear to be the only feasible way to be able to bring
together the people from different organizations (or different units of a single
organization) and turn the emergency management function into a continuous
operation for those that need to be involved. It has the added benefit of the resulting
command and control function becoming a virtual command and control center.
Given that we had lost the local command and control centers in both 9/11 and
hurricane Katrina for the initial 48 h or longer, this becomes an obvious direction to
take. The need to allow people in different dispersed locations to get to know one
another and work regularly together is another important element of developing the
trust necessary for those collaborating in an emergency response environment (Hiltz
et al. 2005).
6.3 Emergency management
The endeavors of emergency management and business continuity need to
become recognized professions in both industry and government. Today we face
threats of great sophistication and wide-scale complexity that will demand a high
quality of societal performance and commitment for our civilization to survive.
As our society increasingly rests upon a foundation of information and
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communications systems, the so-called hacking threat of the past has given way
to information warfare and international processes for identity theft and fraud.
Where we once contended with nature as the source of major disasters we are
increasingly faced with man-made disasters of both a short-term and long-term
nature. The hundred-year disasters are becoming much more frequent and
Mother Nature seems to be reacting to some of the abuses we have practiced
upon her. In the US the age of critical infrastructure (roads, sewers, power grids,
bridges, etc.) are now older than they have ever been in recent history (since the
late 1940s) and growing older still with the lack of adequate replacement and
maintenance budgets resulting from the short-term planning horizons and the
pressures for budget cutbacks that are easier to politically make in the area of
maintenance and replacement.
Instead of focusing on discovering our mistakes and correcting them, our current
pressures in both the public and private sector focus on concerns for liability and
political fallout, which tend to force the obfuscation of problems and mistakes in all
sectors of the society (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). We still find infighting for
political control of the emergency management function between different
application areas (fire, police, medical) and the resulting segmentation of the
problem rather than the recognized need for high-quality professionals in the field to
be given control for integrated approaches for preparedness and response (Van de
Walle and Turoff 2006). Our responses to major disasters still seem to be short term
spasms of response that are not integrated into long term plans of mitigation and
recovery that would smooth out the difficulties in the recovery process years after
the event. The fact that the FEMA maps for who should need flood insurance and
who would not were thirty years out of date left large numbers of people with no
funds to rebuild their homes and massive numbers of court cases now trying to
determine if Katrina destroyed homes by wind or water! This is hardly a situation
that gives confidence to the public in the ability of a government to protect them in
future disasters.
In conclusion, we need a major commitment as a society to treat emergency
management as a process that involves integrated planning by all the segments of
the society so that mitigation and recovery, for example, are treated as two sides of
the same coin. The tools for decision support need to be encompassing in that
emergency management is a true multicriteria problem not easily reduced to smaller
problems like models of the impact of weather on clouds of toxic substances. We
have many such models in the literature, and not one that allows examination of the
life cycle of a disaster impacting on a given location or organization that treats the
balance between mitigation and recovery years before and years after the event, and
integrates the requirements for resources to treat the event for the totality of the
given location or the given organization.
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